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Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law. By 
ROBERT C. PosT, et a!. [Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press. 2001. 169, (Bibliography) I and (Index) 3 pp. Paperback £14.50. 
ISBN 0--8223-2713-9.] 
THIS is a small volume with large ambition. The centrepiece is an argument 
by a prominent legal academic (Robert C. Post) on how and why to re-
conceptualise American anti-discrimination law. His proposal is commented 
on by four equally august scholars drawn from departments as diverse as 
African-American studies and philosophy (K. Anthony Appiah), rhetoric 
and comparative literature (Judith Butler), and law (Thomas C. Grey and 
Reva B. Siegel, respectively), with Post given a final rejoinder. The complex 
and thoughtful contributions in this volume provide a welcome addition to 
the growing discipline examining the intersection of legal doctrine and 
visual culture, of which the most prominent branch is perhaps that of 
critical race theory. 
Post's essay ("Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American 
Antidiscrimination Law") begins with the claim that the rationale 
underlying current anti-discrimination Jaw compels the judiciary to 
formulate remedies that "liberate individuals from the thrall" of socially 
held stereotypes, when in reality Jaw itself can do no more than "reshape 
the nature and content" of those conventions ( p. I). According to Post, 
anti-discrimination proviSions are geared towards ameliorating 
disadvantages that individuals incur when their appearances are associated 
with inaccurate judgments about their capabilities and moral worth. While 
disassociation may seem like a laudable goal, wholly diverging personal 
visible identity from appearance engenders difficulties because the two 
concepts are linked. Moreover, a legal regime that vitiates their connection 
for the sake of upholding people's dignity or worth (as an example, 
through application of "colour blind" policies) is invariably overreaching. 
As an alternative, Post advocates for an anti-discrimination theory that 
would acknowledge its true goal as seeking to change those practices 
underlying undesirable social convention. Doing so requires society to resist 
the "dominant perspective" that imagines law "as standing in a neutral 
space outside of history", and to instead "recognise how law functions to 
embody itself in history" (pp. 39, 41). 
Appiah ("Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity") notes that 
stereotypes have various manifestations, including statistical, false, and 
normative ones. Further, accepting Post's sociological understanding of 
stereotypes as contributing to the formation of personal identity raises 
concerns that stereotypes will not only facilitate third parties in excluding 
certain people, but also act as a disincentive for those individuals to invest 
in themselves. Because Appiah perceives anti-discrimination Jaw as 
encompassing ideals of autonomy, dignity, and individualism, he suggests 
that it focus on the question of "what makes two people or two kinds of 
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people morally alike" for the purpose of understanding equality theory 
( p. 57). 
Adding to the critique of Post's conception of stereotypes, Butler 
("Appearances Aside") takes issue with the idea of personal identity 
expressed through stereotype as being either static or controlling. Butler 
argues, instead, that an individual can have several personal identities, 
depending on changing social circumstances, and that each of these selves 
can contribute to an overall self-identity. Hence, she maintains that law 
should not endorse social conventions that define and fix personhood. 
Grey's essay ("Cover Blindness") locates Post's thesis within "the 
conventional landscape of American civil rights history, theory, and 
doctrine" ( p. 87). He observes that the first wave of anti-discrimination 
was directed at overt exclusions based on personal identity characteristics, 
such as race-based restrictions. By contrast, contemporary civil rights law 
requires "deliberate strategic intervention into social life" (p. 89). As an 
instrumentality of change, Grey asserts that law must always be understood 
contextually as a mechanism that "reinterprets and often redirects the force 
of the social impulses that drive its content" (95-96). 
Modelling her perspective on anti-discrimination law from a socio-
historical perspective, Siegel ("Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How 
'Color Blindness' Discourse Disrupts and Rationalises Social 
Stratification") focusses on social stratification, a concept that is absent 
from Post's essay. Believing that this notion must be understood if any 
sense is to be made of anti-discrimination law's central trope of identity-
blindness, Siegel provides a detailed account of how social stratification 
among groups is a result of "the interaction of social structure and social 
meaning" (p. 100). Next, her essay describes how legal discourse on colour 
blindness can either diminish or reinforce social stratification, depending on 
the time and sociohistorical context of the dialogue. 
In the concluding section, Post ("Response to Commentators") 
reiterates several of his earlier assertions, including the motivating 
aspiration of analysing anti-discrimination law from an external, 
sociological, perspective that would reveal how that area of jurisprudence 
"actually functions" (p. 160). 
Providing some astute and interesting insights into anti-discrimination 
law, Prejudicial Appearances is a brief but illuminating invitation to further 
explore the ways in which individuals are treated because of their 
appearance, as well as what law can, and possibly should, do to counteract 
those effects. If the book has a failing it is in its scope. There are many 
personal identity characteristics that need not be related to readily 
discernable characteristics, homosexuality and mental disability to name 
but two examples, that also subject individuals to unequal treatment 
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